Board¶
Ticket-style board for house-pipeline work on this repo. Ticket prefix:
ODY. This tracks house-pipeline integration/audit work, not Odysseus'
own feature development (see ROADMAP.md, GitHub Issues, and
docs/pr-blocker-audit.md for that).
Live artifact: deferred (per house pipeline convention - republish here once a live board artifact exists).
Done¶
- ODY-2 - Coverage floor enforced in CI:
fail_under = 44(pyproject.toml) -
enforcing
coverage reportstep inpython-tests; floor set 1pt below the 45.96% measured 2026-07-11 (fleet measurement on ANDREWBEDROOMTV, dev6efc07c, 4420 passed / 111 failed / 21 errors / 6 skipped). Known test FAILURES remain informational (masked with a CI warning) until the suite is green — the floor is a decay ratchet, not a quality gate; coverage from failing tests still counts. Commitsfd1a858+ the enforcement fix. 2026-07-11, overnight WT-2566. -
ODY-1 - House pipeline re-audit: secret pre-scan classification (24 flagged hits, all fixtures/false-positives, none real), Codex security review, docs-set gap-fill (
TESTING.md,docs/technical/ARCHITECTURE.md,docs/plain/README.md, this board,docs/MAKING-OF.mdchapter 1), test suite run + coverage numbers recorded, CI gap-fill (semgrep.ymlSAST job,churn.yml5x flake-detection job). 2026-07-08.
Backlog (carried over from existing ROADMAP.md / issues, not new)¶
- Suite red on dev: 111 failed + 21 errors (measured 2026-07-11) — burn this
down, then unmask test failures in
python-tests(see ODY-2 note). - No mutation testing (mutmut) - full-suite run not "quick" given ~1,300 test
files; scoping to a single security-critical module (e.g.
core/auth.py) is a reasonable first slice. - No hermetic browser E2E harness; frontend behavior coverage currently comes
from the
tests/streaming/*.mjsNode harness and many*_js.pytests that exercise static JS logic, not a full browser flow. - Org migration:
originremote is underpewdiepie-archdaemon, notandrewjonesdev- out of scope for this audit, flagged for the org migration pass. - CI installs Python dependencies unpinned (
pip install -r requirements.txtwith floating package names) - flagged MEDIUM by the Codex security review in this audit.dependency-review.ymlalready runspip-audit(advisory) and blocks PRs that add a known-vulnerable dependency, which covers the "don't ship a CVE" case; it does not cover reproducibility (two installs on different days can resolve different versions) or integrity (no hash verification). GitHub Actions are already SHA-pinned; Python packages are not. Fix is hash-pinning (pip-compile --generate-hashesor auv.lock) plus CI hash verification - deferred as a larger change than this audit's scope.